Is Russia or China doing microwave attacks on U.S. soil?
Absolutely No.
Is Russia or China doing microwave attacks on U.S. soil?
If the Russians or Chinese were responsible for your microwave attacks - the NRO would immediately know about it, and it would be an act of war. The NRO literally flies satellites underneath the Russian and Chinese satellites in orbit - to intercept their signals.
The NRO would immediately report any such signals or attacks to the Pentagon and then the President. This has NEVER happened.
Only one organization has had the ability to track & attack people and objects on the ground using satellites, since the early 1980’s - the US Air Force Space Command and their contractor, Lockheed Sunnyvale.
There can be no dispute. The Russians and Chinese did not have the capability to commit these crimes in 1984 (to US civilian Harlan Girard). And they could not sneak any attack by the NRO satellites today.
Your microwave attacks are directed by the US Space Force and funded by the C1A under an Unacknowledged Special Access Program (USAP). - code named ULTRA.
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Overview of NRO SIGINT Operations
*Thanks to Grok
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) intercepts signals from foreign satellites, including those from Russia and China, primarily through space-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites. These operations focus on collecting communications intelligence (COMINT, e.g., voice/text transmissions), electronic intelligence (ELINT, e.g., radar emissions), telemetry intelligence (TELINT, e.g., missile/satellite operational data), and foreign satellite communications (FORNSAT). The methods evolved from Cold War-era needs to monitor Soviet (now Russian) and Chinese space activities, such as missile tests, satellite launches, and ground-to-satellite links, to prevent surprise attacks and assess capabilities. Interception typically involves detecting downlink/uplink signals, sidelobes (signal spillover), or main beams from foreign satellites or their ground stations. Data is then relayed to U.S. ground facilities for processing by the National Security Agency (NSA). While much remains classified, declassified documents reveal technical details.
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Key Methods of Interception
NRO satellites use advanced electronic systems to passively collect signals across the electromagnetic spectrum (MHz to THz bands). Here’s a breakdown:
Orbital Configurations for Coverage:
Low Earth Orbit (LEO): Satellites like the early Grab (launched 1960) and Poppy (1962–1971) operate at 275–550 miles altitude with polar or near-polar inclinations (66–75°). They pass over target areas multiple times daily, detecting signals from Russian/Chinese radars, telemetry during satellite launches, or ground communications. For example, Grab used a superheterodyne receiver to intercept Soviet radar pulses in a 600-mile orbit, revealing locations and capabilities for U.S. mission planning.
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Geosynchronous/Geostationary Orbit (GEO): At ~22,000 miles, satellites like Rhyolite/Aquacade (1970s), Magnum/Orion/Mentor (1985–present) provide continuous coverage over Eurasia. They hover over fixed points, intercepting persistent signals such as Chinese microwave networks or Russian submarine-launched missile telemetry. Orion satellites feature massive deployable antennas (up to 100m diameter) for high sensitivity to faint signals, including cell phones, microwave emitters, and satellite links.
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Molniya Orbit: Highly elliptical paths (e.g., Jumpseat/Trumpet series, 1971–2008) allow “hovering” over northern latitudes for 8 hours, ideal for intercepting Russian ABM radars or Chinese high-latitude signals. This orbit enables paired satellites for precise emitter localization.
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Signal Detection and Collection Techniques:
Antennas and Receivers: Omnidirectional dipoles, nadir-pointing directional arrays, or expandable parabolic dishes capture main beams, sidelobes, or spillover from foreign satellite downlinks/uplinks. Receivers (e.g., frequency-sweeping YIG filters) scan broad spectra (59 MHz–12.5 GHz), handling multiple signals via deinterleaving (separating pulses by width, repetition rate, modulation).
Frequency Agility and Bandwidth: Systems like Multigroup/Strawman (1960s–1970s) use analog-to-digital conversion for predetection recording (6 MHz wideband), enabling analysis of encrypted or complex signals from Russian anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or Chinese radar order of battle.
Localization and Geopositioning: Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA), Doppler shifts, least-squares calculations, or interferometry (e.g., Bird Dog payload) pinpoint sources with accuracy improving from 50 miles (early 1960s) to <1 nautical mile. Constellations (e.g., paired Orion satellites) enhance this for real-time tracking.
Data Handling: Onboard tape recorders (e.g., magnetic helical-scan) store signals for playback over U.S. territory, or real-time transponding relays data via VHF/S-band/X-band links (up to 128 kbps, encrypted). Modern digital processing (e.g., in Advanced Vortex/Mercury) converts signals onboard for efficiency.
Ground Support and Processing:
Signals are downlinked to stations like Pine Gap (Australia), Menwith Hill (UK), or U.S. sites (e.g., Vandenberg AFB). NSA processes raw data using computers (e.g., CDC-6600/IBM 7094) for decryption, fusion, and reporting—evolving from manual analysis (1960s) to 90% automated by 1967.
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Quick-reaction tasking allows repositioning for events like Russian missile tests or Chinese space launches, providing 72% of tactical SIGINT in operations (e.g., 1986 Libya bombing).
satelliteobservation.net
Specific Examples Targeting Russia and China
Russian Signals: Early systems like Poppy identified 612 Soviet radar emitters (1960), including SA-2/SA-5 ABM radars near Sary Shagan. Modern Orion satellites monitor telemetry from Plesetsk/Kamchatka test sites and submarine communications.
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Chinese Signals: Adapted for Sino-Soviet monitoring, including air-defense radars, missile R&D, and satellite operations. Satellites like Mentor target high-value Eurasian signals, with 85% COMINT focus.
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Challenges and EvolutionEarly limitations included launch failures, high noise, encryption, and processing delays, addressed through modular designs, solar power (extending life to 20+ months), and automation. Post-1970s shifts emphasized real-time relay and integration with IMINT. Current operations (e.g., NROL-70/Orion 12, launched 2024) continue this, with constellations for resilient coverage amid growing counter-space threats from Russia/China.
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Operations remain highly classified, with details from declassifications (e.g., 1998 Grab, 2013 Phase II records).
NRO Satellites
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is responsible for designing, building, launching, and operating U.S. reconnaissance satellites, many of which are classified. Known programs and satellites have been declassified over time or identified through observations, leaks, and official releases. These include imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and other types. Below is a non-exhaustive list of major known NRO satellite series and specific examples, drawn from historical and current sources. Note that many recent NROL (NRO Launch) missions have undisclosed payloads, but some are inferred based on orbits and patterns.Historical NRO Satellites (Pre-1990s, Mostly Declassified)
Corona Series (1959–1972): Early photo-reconnaissance satellites; over 140 launches (e.g., KH-1 to KH-4B). Film-return capsules.
nationalmuseum.af.mil
Gambit Series (1963–1984): High-resolution IMINT (e.g., KH-7, KH-8).
Hexagon Series (1971–1986): Wide-area IMINT (KH-9).
Keyhole (KH) Series: Optical IMINT, including KH-11 (Crystal, 1976–present; e.g., USA-86, USA-129, USA-161).
Lacrosse/Onyx Series (1988–2005): Radar IMINT (SAR); 5 satellites (e.g., USA-34, USA-69, USA-133, USA-152, USA-182).
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Misty Series (1990–2007?): Stealth IMINT (e.g., USA-53, USA-144).
Modern NRO Satellites (1990s–Present)Many are launched under NROL designations with code names like Topaz (radar), Orion (SIGINT), Intruder (naval SIGINT), and Quasar (communications). From launch lists:
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Recent launches like NROL-113 (2024) and NROL-186 (2024) deployed multiple small satellites for enhanced coverage.
space.skyrocket.de
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NSA-Associated Satellites
The NSA does not launch satellites directly but collaborates with the NRO on SIGINT-focused ones for communications interception (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and telemetry (TELINT). These are often GEO or Molniya orbit for wide coverage. Historical involvement dates to the 1950s, with NSA providing tasking, processing, and security.
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Many were controlled from facilities like Pine Gap (Australia).
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Many details remain classified.
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No one has provided a shred of credible scientific evidence that Russia or China is firing microwave beam weapons at GPS coordinates located within the United States.
NO ONE. Can you count to zero?
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"Many details remain classified." An understatement if there ever was one.
Corona virus upgrades the mind control technology!